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By Letter of 12 November 1981 the President of the Council of the European 
Communities requested the European Parliament to deliver an opinion on the proposal 
from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a directive 
recommendation on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States. 
On 16 November 1981 the Presjdent of the European Parliament referred this 
proposal to the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs as the committee 
responsible and to the Committee on Transport for an opinion. 
At its meeting of 24 November 1981 the Committee on Economic.and Monetary 
Affairs appointed Miss Forster rapporteur. 
The committee considered the Commission's proposal and the draft report 
at its meetings of 27-28 April 1982, 18-19 May 1982 and 3-4 November 1982. 
At the Last meeting, the committee decided unanimously with 3 abstentions 
to recommend to Parliament that it approve the Commission's proposal with the 
following amendments: 
The committee then adopted the motion for a resolution as a whole by 6 
votes to 1, with 4 abstentions. 
The following took part in the vote: Mr Moreau, chairman, Mr Hopper and 
Mr Macarlo, vice-chairmen; Miss Forster, rapporteur; Mr Bonaccini, Mrs Desouches, 
Mr Herman, Mr Hutton (deputizing for Mr de Ferranti), Mr Papantoniou, Mr Wedekind 
(deputizing for Mr Schnitker) and Mr Welsh. 
The opinion of the Committee on Transport is attached. 
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(' 
The Ccmnittee oo Econanic and Monetary Affairs hereby subnits to the European 
Parliament the follc:Ming arnenanents and notion for a resolution together with 
explanatory statement: 
hrenanents prqx>sed b:t the 
carrni.ttee on Econanic and 
Monetary Affairs 
Text ~reposed by the Camri.ssion 
of European Cannunities 
Proposal for a Council Directive 
(EEX:) on tariffs for scheduled 
air transport between Member 
States (Doc. 1-740/81> 
Preamble, recitais and Aiticle 1 unchanged ' I 
(Unchanqed) 
.Amen<i'nent No. 1 
----------
Article 2 (b) should read as follows: 
------------------------------------
(b) Air carrier rreans an air transport 
enterPITse which is established in 
the Community and is effectivclt 
C:ontrolled through a substantia 
share in its ownership or otherwise 
by one or more Member States and/or 
by nationals of Member States, and is 
authorised by one or more Member 
States to operate scheduled 
international air services within 
the Ccmnunity; 
I 
I 
Article 2 • 
2. For the purposes of this direcJve 
(a) Air tariffs me£Ul the prices to be 
paid in the applicable local legal : 
tender for the carriage by air of 
passengers, baggage and freight, in ' 
accordance with the conditions under 
which those prices apply, including 
prices and conditions offered to 
interrrediaries; 
(b) Air carrier rreans an air transport 
enterprise Whfc"h is authorised by t~ 
or more Member States to operate 
scheduled international air services 
between those States; 
Articles 2 (c) (d). (e) (f) and (q) unchanged 
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--
(tJnchanfld) 
~!h •. a _____ _.....;::=:..:.-: 
(a) are reasonably related to the 
overall costs of the awlicant air 
carrier including a sat~sfactory 
return on investment on the 
assumpt1on that itspr1nc~pal 
place of business is located in 
the State of origin. 
lvrencm:mt No. 3 
---------------
~!S~-~.:!.J.21~~..!!.!2!~: 
(b) are sufficient to cove,r the 'COStS 
of the Cl('Plicant carrier on the 1"'U'te 
in quest~on plus a reasonable margin 
for overheads and profit, taking due 
account of the characteristics of the 
route. Where the state Of origin 
decides that the route merits sane 
subsidy for social or ochet"' special 
reasons such as 1n pcn.phcrai reg1ons, 
the exiStence ortn1s sUbsfdyshall &;-:revca!cd;--------
(Unchanged) 
Anendnent No. 4' 
---------------
Article 3.2 ·to read as follows: 
------------------------------
2. An air carrier ·Shall, ~, 
be penni tted to match an existing 
tariff, pratique ·par un.e ·autre 
carpagnie. 
• 
'q 
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Article 3 
1. '!'he states conoerned shall take 
all appropriate measures to ensure 
that air tariffs 
(a) are reasonably related to the 
costs of an efficient air carrier on 
the as5U!t!Ption that its principal 
place of business is located 
in the state of origin, while 
allowing for a satisfactory return 
on investment and taking due account 
of the characteristics of the route; 
(b) s:e sufficient to co\ler the costs 
of the carrier on the route in question 
plus a resonable margin for overheads 
and pro£it; 
(c) have due .regard to the requirements 
of various user categories and encourage 
the develqxrent of demand by new 
categories of users while the tariff 
structure shall remain as simple as 
possible; 
(d) are <>f·fered ·on conditions which are 
clear erR!i understandable. 
2. ·An air oa:tri.er, 'S~l:l, ·however, be 
permitted to match an existing tariff, 
which has been apprOVed for another 
airline in accordance with this Directiwe 
for the same route with the same 
originating point. 
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(Unchanged) 
Arrendment No. 5 
--------------
Article 4 (b) to read as follows: 
--------------------------~-----
(b) at the option of that air carrier, 
following consultation with any other 
airline(s) for the purpose of fixing 
the terms of interlining or in order to 
sinplify and standardise conditions 
associated with air tariffs. Member 
States concerned and the Commission 
may participate as observers at 
these consultations and may agree to 
a request from the airlines that matters 
other than thOse actually specllfied 
1.n t1i1s Art1cfe~~tilcrr~;c-u-s;;ccrprovided 
tf1-•. it-tF1e-reprcsentuTives of the 
cainission and the ~lri.JCrsEates 
concerned are present during the 
dlSCUSSlOOS. 
Article 4 
Member States shall permit an air 
carrier to establish air tariffs; 
(a) individually; or 
(b) at the option of that air carrier, 
following consultation with any other 
airline(s) for the purpose of fixing 
the terms of interlining or in order 
to simplify and standardise conditions 
associated with air tariffs. Member 
States concerned and the Commission 
may participate as observers at these 
consultations. 
, Article 5 unchanged 
(Unchanged) 
Article 6. 2 to read as follows: 
------------------------------
2. If the second state agrees with 
the decision of the first state, 
the air tariff shall not come into 
force. 
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Article 6 
1. When a state conCE".rned (hereafter 
called the first state) decides not 
to approve an nir tariff in confotmity 
with article 5.4, it sh«ll inform the 
airline ru1d the other state concerned 
(herafter called the second state) in 
writing stating its reasons. 
2. · If the second state agrees with the 
decision of the first state, the state 
of origin shall request the airline 
concerned to file a new air tariff. 
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.Anenarent No. 7 · 
-------ill-
3. If the second state di~ees 
with the aeelslon ol the lirs state, 
the states ~me<! #11 at¥"@t to 
resolve theli sagreement by a method 
of their chOice (which may include 
arbitratic;wt), withi~ (6) weeks. If 
disagreement persists thereaftert either 
of tne states conoernea ~ reler ihe 
disagreement to the ~ssion, for 
i"CECislOn urder ~ragraP!l 4. 
. -~t""· 8 
----------- ~..:::::.:..~- .... , . 
Delete Article 6.-4 I 
) 
Delete Article 6.5 
3. If the second state disagrees 
with the decision of the first state, 
it shall so notify the first state 
within 2 weeks of being informed and 
request a consultation. The first 
state shall make its representatives ~ 
available at short notice for 
consultation on the air tariff ( s) . For 
this consultation the states concerned 
shall on request supply all relevant 
information to each other. At the 
consultation the states concerned shall 
endeavour to agree on the air tariff 
as filed or agree on nOOi.fications theretc 
t, 
-· 
, 
4. If at ~-' expu),.. of one rronth 
after the date on which the second 
state was notified disagreement still : 
persists, the state of origin can : 
approve the air tariff unilaterally, 
after having ascertained that the 
criteria of article 3 are ret, or , 
subject to such modifications as will : 
make it comply with article 3. In 
this case the air tariff shall care 
into force two weeks after the approval 
of the state of origin except where 
the other state concerned within 
this period refers the matter to the 
Carmi.ssion for decision under paragraph 
6. 
5. Where no agreement is -reached , 
under the procedure set dut in paragraph 
3, or where action is taken under paragcapt 
4, the dispute may, at the request ! 
of any· Member State concerned, be 1 
referred to .the Camlission. 
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4. The Cammission shall within 30 
working days of referral of a 
disagreement take a decision on the 
conformity of the air tariff to the 
criter1a laid down in Art1cle 3. 
Upon referral of a dispute to the 
Ccmnission, the states concerned shall 
immediately make available all 
pertinent information at their 
di !3posal to the Camtission. · The 
Commission shallnotify its 
decision to the states concerned. 
AnEndment No. 11 
----------------
Anendment No. 12 ------------~--
New Article 6. 5 to read as follows: 
----------------------------------
, 
5. The decision of the Cammission 
:eferred to in paragraph 4 shall come 
u1to force after 30 days, unless a 
Menlber State or the CamJ.ssion refers 
the question within 14 days to 
the Air Tariffs Ccmnittce (hereinafter 
call6:ft.J1e Committee), e::£ablished 
.pursuant to Aeticic-·7 of this 
uirer:tive, for ltS ornnion. 'I'he 
camiit.iec will also gTveTts--
9£inion in the abs0.ncc of « decision 
by-fficcarfiils'"'Si'On-within the 30 
~rkinq __ dlys spec1:f:ied Ltr1de--r-Article 
6.4. The Corrrnittee shall deliver 1ts 
opinion on the camJ.S"Slo""i1' s dccTSTcil 
within a tirre limit to be set by 
th~ chainnan according to the urgency 
of the question under consider.:ttion. 
giinions shall be acl.opted by a maJority 
of 45 votes. If the Oanmittee has 
not df'U\'cred its cpinion w1th1n 
thl.'~ t 1rx.• ljmit set hy th<' Ch.unnan, 
Bin CCAmu t·tcc sh,11Tlx!d0c·iri;a··ro-
h:1v(• _,E~-1Tv·~·r.c.r:-ttiivoi1i:ihr._;-q;:Lnion. 
The Ccmru.ss1on' s dCcislon shall cane 
~force 5 days after the Commlttee 
has deliverect-i"TaVOuruble opinion. 
_ __...----
---------- -~ 
6. The Ccmnission shall within 30 
working days of the date of referral 
after consulting the Member States 
concerned take a decision. Upon 
referral of a dispute to the 
Commission, the states concerned 
shall bnmediately make available all 
pertinent infonnation at their dispos.:tl 
to the Ccmnission. The Cannission 
shall notify its decision to the 
states concerned. 
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7. In the absence. of a decision 
by the Commission within 30 working 
days fran the date of referral the air 
tariff shall cane into effect until 
such date as the decision of the 
Commission comes into force. 
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If the &:!cision of the Camdssion is 
not ~n accoraance with the opin~on 
of the Canni. ttee, the Ccmni.ss~on 
shall forthwith communicate its 
decision to the Councll. 'l1le Council, 
acting by a qualified majority, may, 
within one rronth reverse the 
Commission's deCision. Unless the 
Counc1l reverses the Ccmnission 1 s 
&!C"'"ISIOn w1th~n the said period of 
one ronth, the catrftission' s decision 
: shall cane into force 5 days after 
~ /the e,._yiration of the said peri¥ 
! ol one ronth. · n 
. 
/ 
GmERAL PROVISIONS 
New Article 7 
Aaendftent No. 13 
~_,...,__- -~ 
1. An air Tariffs Ccmni.ttee shall 
be established consistin<J ol ~sentatives 
of the Member St~tes and pres~ over bY a 
I"!Presentati ve o the Camd.ss1on. 
Amencirent No. 14 
~~--~--~·--~~-
New Article 7.2 to read as follows: 
-------------~------~--~--
2. Au sein du Canite les 't!ecisions se 
2rennent i la majoriti se!on une proc:eaure dE!C:i&e par !e 6ilii te. 
New Article 8 
Amendment No. 15 
-~---~---~---~-
1. At least once a year, each Mesmer 
State shall call on an Air Transport 
Users Canni.ttee to express its qN.nion 
on air fares and related matters for 
which purpose the members of the 
Comnittee shall be supplied with an 
appropriate information. This 
Ccmnittee shall in each Member State 
include the main consumers' interests 
concerned with matters of this kind. 
~o such independent Ccmnittee 
ex~sts, the state concerned shall 
set one up ln such d way that its 
sUbsequent operatton ~ as 
Tnidejpenocnt as possible. 
1. At least OACe a year, each Member 
State shall call on an Air Transport 
Users Carmittce· to exp.~ress its 
opinion on air f!aa:es and related 
matters for whiclt ~ the roombers 
of the CCmn.ittee shall be supplied witll 
an appropriate information. This 
Committee shall in each Member 
State include the mair.\ consumers' 
interests conce~ ~th matters of 
this kind. !f no such Ccmnittee 
exists, the state concettnecf shall 
set one up. 
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(Unchanged) 
New Article 9 
New Article 9.1 to read as follows: 
----------------------------------
1. The Camti.ssion shall every rear 
after the 1st January 1983, publ1sh a 
report on the scheduled air 
tariffs to which Article 6 has been 
applied. 
Arrendrrent No. 17 
----------------
New Article 9.2 to read as follows: 
----------------------------------
2. For the purposes. of th.ls report, 
the Member States shall info~ the 
Commission of all such air tariffs 
filed with them -. when Article 6 
has been invoked during the relevant 
period, and, at the request of the 
Commission, provide details with 
respect to the confo~ty of the 
procedures actually adopted ~ 
Member States with the provisions 
of this directive and the conformity 
of such air tariffs with the criteria 
in Article 3. 
(Unchanged) 
(Unchanged) 
2. 'ttle Catrni.ssion shall convene 
periodically, at least once a year, 
representatives of the transport 
users committees referred to in 
paragraph 1, for an exchange of 
views at Community level. 
Old Article 8 
1. '!he camd.ssion shall every second 
year after the lst of January 1983, 
publish a report on the scheduled 
air tariffs to which this directive 
applies. 
2. For the purposes of this report, 
the Member States shall inf~ the 
Ccrrmi.ssion of all such air tariffs 
filed with them and of any instance 
when Article 6 has been invoked during 
the relevant period, and, at the request 
of the Commission, provide details with 
respect to the confonnity of too 
procedures actually adopted by Member 
States with the provisions of this 
directive and the confo~ty of such 
air tariffs with the criteria in 
Article 3. 
3. Before issuing the report, the 
Commission shall as it thir~s fit 
consult with the representatives 
of the Air Transport Users Committees 
airlines, governments and other 
interested parties. 
4. Confidonti.11 infonnat.ion obtained 
by the application of this directive 
is covered by the professional 
secrecy. 
Old Articles 9 and 10 (New Articles 10 and 11) unchanged 
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A 
~QIIQ~_fQ8_8_B;§Qb~IlQ~ 
closing the procedure for consultation of the European Parliament on the proposal 
from the Commission of the European Communities to the Council for a Directive CEEC) 
on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States 
-having regard to the proposal from the Commission to the Council <COMC81) 590 
finaL) 1, 
-having been consulted by the Council <Doc. 1-740/81>, 
having regard to the Commission's report on 'Scheduled passenger air fares in the 
EEC' CCOM(81) 398 final>, 
recalling its previous resolutions on the air transport sector and on competition 
l . 2 po 1cy ., 
- having regard to the report of the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs and 
of the opinion of the Committee on Transport (Doc. 1-847/82), 
- having regard to the result of the vote on the proposal from the Commission, 
1. Believes that various studies carried out recently3, including that of the 
· Commission4, have identified a number of important issues regarding the level of 
air fares within the Community which deserve closer examination: 
- the considerable discrepancy between fares within the Community and those 
prevailing in certain other markets, notably within and to the United States; 
- the apparent differentials in levels of productivity and of efficiency 
between European airlines as a whole and their American counterparts, and also 
between scheduled and non~cheduled airlines; 
-----------1 OJ No. C 78, 30.3.1982, p. 6 
2 OJ No. C 291, 10.11.1980, OJ No. C 11, 18.1.82, p. 72 
3 
e.g. AUC, CAA, TAl and ECAC studies referred to in Annex of the report 
4 COMC81) 398 final 
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5. Points out that the above considerations are not justifications for inaction, 
but illustrate the need for care in moving towards a better system, which would 
help meet some of the problems outlined above while still preserving beneficial 
features of the present system; 
6. Welcomes the Commission's proposal on scheduled air fares as a limited but 
useful step in the right direction; 
7. Strongly supports the thrust of Article 3 that air fares should be more closely 
related to costs; 
8. Points out that it may be necessary to permit a wider scope for inter-airline 
consultations that would be permitted under the terms of Article 4 as 
presently drafted, provided _that representatives of national goverrnrents and 
of the Ccmnission may always participate as observers in such consultations. 
I 
9. Agrees with the country of origin principle proposed by the Commission in 
Article 6, which would permit individual countries placing a priority on 
lower air fares the opportunity tb make a certain progress towards that goal. 
' 
10. Supports the principle that disputes between Member States could be referred 
to the Commission pursuant to the provisions in Article 6 of the Commission's 
proposal, but suggests that confidence in this procedure would be reinforced 
by the creation of a Consultative Air Tariffs Committee, which could give its 
opinion on Commission decisions, and in the case of a difference between 
the Carmittee and the Commission the matter should be resolved by the Council. 
Believes that in due course this type of procedure could also be applicable 
to disuptes over questions of market access. 
I 
11. Believes, however, that in the longer tenn, a European Ccmnunity Civil 
Aviation Authority should be established. 
Points out that this could be started off on a limited scale by building up 
a permanent centre of expertise on air transport matters at Ccmnunity level 
and that it could be entrusted with sane of the tasks envisaged under 
Article 9 and also sane of the further studies needed in the field of 
air transport. Believes that eventually it could tackle a much wider range 
of responsibilities, and perhaps such matters as a Community-wide pilot's licence, 
crew conditions, air worthiness and so on. 
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Considers that this would represent the best course of action in Camrunity 
tenns, in providing the basis for an eventual Camrunity-wide franework, 
and in enabling the Community to develop an aviation and airline industry 
of truly European scale. 
~ 
12. Strongly endorses the n~ed for the c~eation of r~present~tive air transport 
user committees in the various Member States as suggested by the Commission, 
but suggests that they be set up in such a way that their subsequent operation 
is as independent as possible. Further believes that it may well be preferable 
to make this concept the subject of a separate Commission proposal. Notes 
finally that there is no single consumer interest to protect but instead 
different categories of consumers with different interests; 
13. Believes that the Commission needs to be given the necessary resources to 
carry out its duties under the proposed directive-; 
14. Supports the Commission's proposal subject to the modifications suggested above; 
15. Urges the Commission to follow through vigorously on the overall strategy it 
set out in its memorandum on • Air Transpor·t: A Community approach •, and to 
take into account the views of the European ~arliament in favour of a measured 
and gradual evolution safeguarding the interests of the public, the airlines 
and their employe~s and avoiding disruption of services to the less developed 
regions of the Community; 
16. Calls on the Conimissioh to submit to Parl i~m~nt;, having repr'd to 'the resolution 
adopted by Parliament on 9.3.1982 O'n the basis of lne rep'Ort b~ Mr Carossino 
<Doc. 1-9Q6~81>, ~ propo$al ~~~ ~n ~ir tr~nspo~t policy th~t ~oul~ allow the 
following measures, amongst others, to be taken: 
1 
swift a~ion of the propoSed regulation applyii'lg Articles 85 and 
8·6 to Air transport as requested by Parlianent in its recent 
resolution 1 
further tacklill9 of the central problem of greater market access, without 
which the pOSsibilities for lowering air fares are limited; 
Motion for a resolution on the regulation applying Articles 85 and 86 of the EEC 
Treaty to air transport, OJ No. 
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Further examination of the ideas recently put forward by the ta~ force 
on canpetition in intra-European air services (CG1PAS) established by 
the European civil Aviation conference ( E:CN::.) and, in particular the 
concept of zones of freedom to compete/safety nets for tariffs, route 
entry and capacity recommended for further study by the task force; 
extension of the scope of the Commission's directive on the transparency 
of financial relations between Member States and their public undertakings 
to include the presently excluded transport sector as well; 
vigorous action to ensure greater transparency of state aids to air 
transport and the establishment of Community guidelines as to when such 
aids are justified and when not; 
greater coordination between the avjation authorities in the various 
Member States aimed at tackling the soaring costs of en-route and Landing 
charges, and the costs of infrastructure, coordination of air traffic 
control, and the harmonization of technical standards for aircraft; 
completion of a proper customs union within the Community, in order to 
reduce unnecessary formalities and radically cut the costs of intra-
Community travel; 
17. Instructs its President to forward to the Council and Commission, as 
Parliament's opinion, the Commission's proposal as voted by Parliament 
and the corresponding resolution. 
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Studies concerning European air fares 
5. As rrentioned above a number of studies have been carried out in recent years on 
the subject of European air fares. AJrong those that have been examined by 
your rapporteur are that of the Air Transport Users Carmittee (AUC) of the 
United Kingdom of December 1976 (followed up by a further study in 1980), the 
United Kingdom Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) study on European Air Fares of 
November 1977, the TAl study carried out for the Commission in October 1980 not 
directly on·air fares but on the related issue of the economic.cost 
structure of air transport in Europe, the European Civil· 
Aviation Conference (OCAC) report on intra-European scheduled air fares. sane 
of the major conclusions fran these various studies are sunmarized in Armex 
to this report. 
!h~-~~~~~~~~~~:~-~~e~~~-~~-:§sb~9~!~9-~~~~~~g~~-~!~-~~~~~-!~-~~~ 
~§~=-1~Q~1~!1_~2~_f!~~!) 
6. The Commission's Report, which took into account the studies 
mentioned above, as well as a number of other studies and sub-
missions, was issued in July 1981. It examined the ways in which 
scheduled passenger air fares are fixed, and the criteria used to. 
evaluate the level of such ~ares, both by the national administra-
_.!ions concerned, and by various affected organisations. It then 
looked at Community air fares in terms of the profitability of 
the Community network, the structure of fares, the relationship 
of fares to the costs of operation' and the level of costs. It 
then drew a number of conclusions to help serve as an initial 
basis for Community policy formulation in this area. 
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1. Among the most significant of these conclusions were ~hat: 
While the profitability per world region is rather sensitive to 
the way costs are allocated, recent studies give no evidence of 
excessive earnings in the EEX:: overall, and that in fact the 
overall profit of scheduled airlines operations in the 
EOC leave much to be desired; 
- There is a wide range of profitability between individual 
routes, implying that some routes are cross-subsidised by 
others. This is generally acceptable in the view of the 
Commission but only to the extent that each route should at 
least cover the incremental costs of operating that route,and 
that the. number of routes that do not fully cover the total 
costs of operation should be strictly limited. Few governments,or 
ai.!:lines .hcJI..1ever, reveal· the infonnation which is necessary' to decide 
whethei' individual air fares ire reasqtably related to oosts. 
- More specifically, the Commission finds that the relationship 
between the normal economy fare and the costs on shorte~ routes 
seems to be quite reasonable but that the margin of profits 
increases considerably on longer distances. The Commission 
finds similar fares over similar distances desirable to some 
extent, but feels that important differences in the costs of 
operation between airlines and/or routes should also be reflectc0 
in the respective tariffs~ 
-The Commission also concludes, guardedly,(p.5l),"that on some 
routes the level of profits may be so high that the question of 
their compatability with Article 86 arises": 
- As regards the contentious issue of the relative efficiency of 
scheduled compared to non-scheduled airlines, the Commission 
concludes that "cascade" studies show that the difference in 
efficiency would not appear to be enormous, but do nevertheless 
exist to an extent which may be as low as 5% and as high as 25% 
depending on the assumptions made; 
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- The Commission also believes that there are a few areas where 
cost reductions or at least cost control should be possible, such as in 
high government charges for the use of infrastructure. There are other 
areas where the airlines themselves have more discretion, such 
as the high level of European sales costs, and changes in the 
products which airlines are offering to passengers, perhaps by 
eliminating some of the services included in many of the present 
fares, which passengers do not always require. 
- In the context of products offered, the Commission considers that 
the present fare structure is too much a result of the interest 
of the airlines, and that there are many routes where consumers 
choice is too limited. The Commission believes (para. 130, p.54) 
that "as long as the airlines are protected both with regard to 
market access and prices, airlines should also offer at least one 
~dled low fare on each route they operate, in addition to an 
economy type fare, which is based on point-to-point transporta-
tion costs with an option of buying a reservation"; 
- Transparency should also be improved and the travelling public 
should be able to have a clearer understanding of what it is 
paying for, and in particular be able to see what price it needs 
to pay in order to obtain greater travelling flexibility; 
- With regard to the process of tariff setting itself, the 
Commission feels that current procedures are rather time consuming 
and that one of the fields for future action for the European 
Community should be to achieve a less rigid tariff setting pro-
cedure for intra-Community air travel; 
- Finally, although the report does not deal directly with issues 
of market access and competition, the Commission believes that 
its previous view has been reinforced that (point 133, p. 55) 
"more opportunities should be given to airline initiatives in 
intra-Community traffic, both with respect to products offered 
on a route and market entry". 
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B. From the evidence above, (and l!,l Annex ) anq as a rt;!sult of JNiOe 
consultatioils with. interested parties, your rapporteur is convinced that no 
simplistic conclusions are possible. 
9. It is clearly unfair to take an int~rnal fligh~ within the United 
States and compare the fare with a ~light over a comparable dis-
tance between different Community Member States, and then to jump 
to hasty conclusions. The differing structures of demand between 
the two areas, the shorter distances in Europe, and the greater 
availability of other forms of transport, the greater number of 
charter flights in Europe - the differing ways in which ancillary 
airline and infrastructure charges are met and above all 
that flights within Europe are "international" with all the 
implications entailed, even including for airport design, are 
among the many factors that preyent straightforward comparisons 
being possible. In a fundamen~al sense, as your rapporteur seeks 
to outline in rather more detail at the end of this report, a 
central reason for the failure of European air fares to be lower 
is the wider failure of the Community itself to achieve greater 
cohesion and to build a true internal market. 
10. Another factor which makes judgements about air fare levels dif-
ficult is the great difference between individual airlines and, 
in particular, between those often independent ones which qlerate a 
small number of well travelled routes and those which have to 
operate large networks, often worldwide, and, which, moreover, 
often include less travelled rou~es maint~ined for p~p1ic service 
~ea~ons. Besides h~ving to maintain unecoqo~ic rout~s, being a 
national c~rrier often also entails other obligations imposed by 
the sponsoring state, such as the maintenance of e~ployment and 
conditions of service at levels not necessarily incumbent on 
i~dependent airlines. 
11. A further difficult issue is the definition of consumer interest. 
It is clear that there is no one consumer interest to protect. 
The busi~essm~n whose major criteria are likely to b~ fre9uency 
of s7Fvice and ma~imqm fl~xibility is a very different consumer 
to th~ l~isu~~ traveller for whom low cost is more likely to be 
pqr~ount. A user who lives in a major capital and wishes to 
travel to another such capital city has a different interest from 
a us~r from a peripheral region for whom the economics of being 
proviqed with a reguaar service to or from his region may only be 
marginal at best. 
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12. Furthermore, your rapporteur has seen no convincing estimates of 
the likely impacts of lowering European air fares on the structure 
of air transport in Europe - and, in particular, the extent to 
which there might he pent-up demand that has not yet been met. 
13. The issue of air fares is h~r.il to separate frcn1 the 
wider issues posed by air transport liberalisation and the emotive 
concept of deregulation, which is of course as much related to 
questions of market access as to level of fares. In this context 
it is not possible to draw instant conclusions from the American 
experience with deregulation. It is still too early to judge 
fairly, and both potentially positive and negative features are 
emerging. Your rapporteur would firmly underline, however, that 
those who are writing off deregulation on the basis of recent 
trends in the industry, in particular the high losses being made 
by many airlines, are doing so prematurely, and secondly, that the 
sceptre of total deregulation and uncontrolled competition should 
not be put forward to block more modest moves towards liberalisatio~ 
14. So, if no simplistic conclusions can be drawn, what should be done 
at Community level? Your rapporteur feels that while the 
evidence concerning the establishment of 1~ levels of air 
fares within the Community ·TIJa.y be inconclusive, the existing status 
quo does need to be subject to much greater scrutiny. 
15. Issues such as the allocation of costs between regions and routes, 
the degree of cross-subsidisation, the implications of inter-
lin,ing and proration, and the exact nature of the services pro-
vided by airlines, are all matters which affect air fare levels, 
and which are technical matters not susceptible to facile judge-
ments by outsiders. Nevertheless, in the absence of effective 
competition in the sector, the national carriers do need to be 
kept on their toes, and the above issues more carefully analysed. 
16. The existing system of multiple bilateral approvals of air fares 
put forward by national carriers generally operating in a II'Oncpoly situation 
results,in practice, in prices being set by the national carrier 
of the country with ~he most restrictive system, in circumstances 
where the costs involved are not apparent, and where there is no 
chancP fc1r a Lhird pnrty competitor to offer different terms. 
Greater transparency, and some degree of liberalisation are thus 
essential. The Commission's proposal on air fares does represent 
a cautious step in these two directions. 
- 23 - PE 77.744/ fin. 
17. 
' , ~ ', '> 'II ' 
Comments on the' Commission's proposal for a directive (COM(81) 590 final) 
' The Commission's proposal for a Council directive on tariffs for 
scheduled air transport between Member St~t~s represents a limited 
response to some of the problems identified in the Commission's 
report as outlined above. 
While generally welcaning the Camri.SSiOfl IS proposal your raworteur haS a nunt>er 
of comments on specific articles. 
Article 3 
18. Article 3 nentions a number of criteria for the evaluqtion of air 
tariffs by the states concerned, the key one being that they should 
take allappropriate measures to ensure that air tariffs" ••• are 
reasonably related to the costs of an efficient air carrier .•. ". 
The second paragraph of this article, however, would permit an air 
carrier to match an existing tariff approved for another airline 
for the same route with the same originating point, even if the 
criteria mentioned in pargraph 1 of the article were not ~et. 
19. The basic thrust behind this article, that air tarifftS should be nore 
closely related to costs, is worthy of strong support. 
20. Nevertheless your rapporteur does have ~ain reservations about this 
article. The concept of an"efficient" airline, for instance, as laid down 
in paragraph l (a) of the article, is an extremely difficult one to 
define in any objective way. While it is clear that certain state-run 
or sponsored airlines are over-staffed and have a number of highly in-
efficient practices, it is nevertheless difficult to compare the efficiency 
of Cl state airline, which must often fulfil non~rcial objectives, 
with that of a private airline operating on one or two well-travell~ 
routes. As regards these state airlines, and without much greater 
tra11spqrc;mcy of the relations between them and their sponl;loring govemavnt, 
it is going to be very hard to judge which such ai:rlines are efficient 
given th;! constraints within which they c.perate, and which instead, are 
genuinely inefficient. Even as regards private airlines efficiency will 
not be easy to judge. OVer what· tine period should an assessm:mt be 
made, for instance, and which criteria should be U$ed?To cite a highly 
tcpical eunple Laker Airways were very efficient according to certain 
criteria, with great consequent benefits to consumers as a whole, but 
much less efficient according to other criteria, to the irmediate financial 
loss of certain selected passengers. 
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While sympathizing then, wit~ the Commission's inclusion o£ the 
word "efficient", your rappor·ceur wonders whether it would not 
be more realistic to have it deleted from the draft text. 
~1. A second reservation concerns relating costs to claely to 
individual routes. Certainly the current situation is 
insufficiently transparent. The degree of cross-subsidization 
and the effects of prorating are not revealed to any extent. 
Furthermore the evidence would seem to indicate that certain 
longer-haul routes in particular, may well be overpriced. 
The ECAC study referred to in Annex claimed that route costs 
could be identified with a reasonable degree of accuracy, but 
others have indicated that problems of allocating overheads between 
routes within the Community and those extending to other parts 
of the world makes this impossible. Nevertheless too great 
an emphasis on the costs of individual routes might also be a 
mistake, and same degree of cross-subsidization would appear 
to be inevitable, for instance to help cover the costs of 
services to certain renote regions. Moreover the existence 
of certain loss leaders is normal commercial practice in most 
businesses. It should also be possible to permit a flexible 
commercial response in air transport as well. 
22. Finally paragraph 2 of Article 3 would permit any air carrier 
to match an existing tariff. This means that the principle 
established in paragraph 1 of relating air tariffs to costs could 
be undercut. 
Article 4 
23. Article 4 seeks to restrict the ability of airlines to get 
together and have consultations on the establishment of air 
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tariffs. In paragraph 4 {b) consultations between airlines 
are only expressly authorised in two cases fixing the terms of 
interlining and simplifying and standardising conditions 
associated with air tariffs. 
24. Your rapporteur has certain reservations about 4 (b). 
Evidence has been submitted arguing that there should be a wider 
scope for inter-airline consultations than would be permitted 
under the terms of this article. These arguments would appear 
to have a certain amount of validity, always on the proviso, 
however, that representatives not just of the member states 
but also of the Commission (or of the new Community aviation 
authority suggested below) do indeed participate at such 
consultations, in order that potential abuses may be detected. 
Your rapporteur has consequently suggested an addition to the 
existing text proposed by the Commission. 
Article 6 
25. Article 6 puts forward two highly controversial concepts, 
arbitration by the Commission and state of origin approval 
unless vetoed by the Commission. These would create a 
derogation from the existing pattern of tariff approval whe+eby 
both states concerned have to agree on a tariff, by providing 
for the state of origin to approve a proposed air tariff 
unilaterally if disagreement between the two states still persists 
after a certain time limit, unless the second state asks the 
Commission to arbitrate. The Commission would have to take a 
decision within 30 working days of the date of referral. In the 
absence of a decision within 30 working days, the air tariff 
would came into effect "until such date as the decision of the 
Commission canes into force". 
26. This is the core of the Commission's proposal. Of the two 
principal elements that it contains your rapporteur strongly 
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supports the country of origin principle, as a useful if 
limited step forward. It would give a country which puts a 
priority on lower air fares the opportunity to allow a certain 
progress towards this goal. It means that air fares would no 
longer be pegged to quite the same extent to the levels desired 
·by the more restrictive carrier. It could even put pressure 
on those countries with more restrictive systems to examine more 
rigorously the fare levels of their own carriers. If not, 
however, there is no reason why discrepancies between the 
one-way fares in each direction should not be allowed to persist, 
and in fact such discrepancies have already existed in the 
past as a result of exchange rate differences. 
27. The second key item in Article 6 concerns Commission arbitration. 
Your rapporteur is not opposed to this concept, but recognizes the 
very real resistance that could be encountered on sovereignty 
and other grounds. At the very least a considerable amount of 
additional expertise would have to be built up by the Commission, 
and yet it would hardly be worth it if only a very limited number 
of cases were referred to the Commission. It should also be noted 
that the Directive as currently drafted does not make clear how and 
in what way the Commission should act as arbitrator. 
28. Your rapporteur has considered two alternatives to the Commission's 
proposal. One would be to form an Air Tariffs Committee consisting 
of representatives of Member States and presided over by a 
representative of the Commission, which could be convened when 
necessary. Within the Committee the votes of Member States would be 
weighted in accordance with Article 148 (2) of the treaty. Such 
a solution could reduce the sovereignty problem that might be seen 
to be posed by Commission arbitration, would not be costly, 
and yet cou~d not have the charge of lack of expertise levelled 
at it. 
29. The second alternative would be to establish an embryonic 
European Civil aviation authority - starting off on a limited 
scale by building up a permanent centre of expertise on air transport 
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matters. It could be entrusted with same of the tasks 
envisaged under Article 8, {see below) and also carry out 
same of the further studies needed in the field of air transport. 
In the long run _it could tackle a much wider range of 
responsibilities, and perhaps such matters as a Community wide 
pilots licence, crew conditions, air worthiness etc. This 
solution would provoke a strong reaction from entrenched national 
bureaucracies, but your rapporteur feels that it might be 
the best course of action in the long te~ when it is hoped 
that the Community may have an aviation and airline industry based 
on a coherent market equivalent in same respects to the current 
American market which dominates the world scene. 
Article 7 
30. Article 7 calls for the establishment of Air Transport Users 
Committee in each Member State when they do not already 
exist, and for them to be consulted on air fares and 
related matters. 
31. The idea of encouraging a network of Air Transport Users 
Committee throughout the Community is an excellent one, which 
is deserving of strong support. Nevertheless the existing 
Article 7 raises a number of doubts {even on the part of 
representatives of the most successful such committee 
the United Kingdom's Air Transport Users Committee, the AUC). 
The doubts concern particularly the phrase "if no such 
Committee exists, the state concerned shall set one up". 
It is surely undesirable to establish such a Committee 
under direct government auspices with officially designated 
"representatives" of various interest groups. 
- 28 ·- PE 77.744/ fin. 
Your rapporteur believes that it would be better to change 
the wording of this article to encourage their formation 
on a voluntary basis. Furthermore the idea of establishing 
Air Transport Users Committees has already been put forward 
by the Commission in their proposal on inter-regional air 
services. Rather than bringing it up in each such proposal, 
and {regrettably) adding an extra bone of contention, it 
might indeed be preferable to put forward an entirely 
separate Commission proposal for the establishment of such 
conunittees. 
Article 8 
32. Article 8 would require the Commission to publish a report 
every second year on scheduled air tariffs. The Member States 
would have to inform the Commission of all such air tariffs filed 
with them, of instances when Article 6 is invoked, and details 
about the conformity of the procedures adopted in Member States 
and individual air tariffs with the provisions of, and 
criteria laid out, in the proposed directive. 
33. The only point which might be conunented upon here is 
whether the Member States should have to inform the Commission or 
the Committee referred to above of all such air tariffs filed with 
them as proposed in Article 8-2, or whether this duty should 
be restricted to disputed tariffs, which would mean far less 
paperwork. If the C~ssion {or the new organisation suggested 
above) were to take on the wider task they should at least 
be given the resources to be able to analyse such information 
properly. 
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Opinion of the Committee on Transport1 
34. Your rapporteur is therefore in favour of the Commission's 
directive subject to a number of modifications to the existing 
text. She notes, however, that the opinion of the Committee 
of Transport adopts instead a hostile attitude, although a 
substantial minority of the Committee dissasociated themselves 
fran the opinion and welcomed the Commission's proposed 
directive. 
The opinion criticises the Directive on the grounds that it is 
"unilateral" and allows introduction of tariffs on the basis of 
approval by the country of origin. Your rapporteur suggests that 
this is an overstatement and that it is based on an incorrect 
reading of Article 6. This quite clearly states that if there 
is disagreement the Commission can be asked to arbitrate and the 
State of Origin can be over-ruled. Your rapporteur has proposed 
an amendment to the Directive which would permit appeal to an Air 
Tariffs Committee consisting of representatives of Member States votin~ 
in accordance with Article 148 (2) of the Treaty. Such a 
procedure would clearly not be unilateral and it is hoped that the 
amendment will be supported by members of the Transport Committee. 
The latter opinion also asks for the interline system to be 
facilitated and your rapporteur has proposed an amendment to 
Article 4 in order to permit the widest possible discussion between 
airlines. It should however be remembered that the provision of 
interlining is costly and that same airline users might-prefer 
to have same less expensive tickets av~lable that do not 
include this benefit. 
The opinion's main recommendation is that developments on the North 
Atlantic Route and in ECAC should be monitored to see how the 
"zones of reasonableness" concept developes in practice and that the 
Commission should withdraw its proposed Directive for at least a year 
or two so this can be done. A recent ECAC Task Force has 
concluded that a bilateral approach to "zones of reasonableness" 
1 
PE 77.117/fin draftsman: Mr Key 
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is the only feasable one and it is understood that the ECAC-USA 
experimental scheme is based on a bilateral approach within a 
multilateral framework. There is nothing in the Directive to 
prevent experiment with zones of reasonableness on a route 
between Member States under a bilateral arrangement. 
Your rapporteUF can therefore see no reason why the Directive 
should be delayed. She would welcome experiment with zones of 
reasonableness within the Community and feels this would be far 
more·useful than data derived from the North Atlantic Routes. 
There the concept is being used to enable an increase in fares, 
and the position is very different from the complex system 
of short haul routes within the Community. Zones of reasonableness 
have as their reference point fares set by existing route operators. 
The concept cannot therefore offer the scope for innovation and 
gradual development which the Directive provides. 
Final Observations 
35. Subject to the above comments your rapporteur recommends 
Parliament support for the Commission's proposals. Nevertheless 
it is clear that this proposal is not e·nough in itself; but 
needs to be complemented by a number of other measures. The 
Commission has already outlined a broad strategy in its 
memorandum 11Air Transport: A Community Approach... It is 
essential that such a broad strategy be maintained. 
36. Parliament has on several occasions called for Community 
competition policy to be extended to the air transport sector 
although in a gradual and judicious way. The Commission's 
proposed council regulation applying Articles 85 and 86 
to air transport {COM {81) 396 fin) is therefore an important 
complementary measure, and has indeed been recently supported 
by the Parliament 1 • Greater competition in the sector will 
eventually have a greater effect on the level of air fares than the 
Commission's current proposal, which leaves untouched the central 
1 Resolution 
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issue of market access. Without greater possibilities for such 
market access the possibilities for lowering air fares are 
limited, and your pepporteur suggests a first step in this 
direction by amending the definition of Air carrier and by 
also proposing that the Air Tariffs Committee might eventually 
consider question ~f access. 
37. A key related need outlined· in this report has been the need for 
much greater transparency. Parliament has, in a previously 
1 
adopted resolution already urged "the Commission to 
institute a system of full transparency of airli~e finances and 
statistics, especially with regard to route profitability." 
An essential step in this regard is to extent the scope of the 
Commission's directive on the transparency of financial relations 
between Member States and their public undertakings to include 
the previously excluded transport sector as well. 
3.8. The Commission must also push harder with regard to the 
control of State aids. The Commission has issued a recent 
working paper on this issue in which it points out (P.3) 
"that in the case of the air transport sector there has been an 
a~ost total failure by the Member States to comply with the 
obligation to notify state aids." The paper does go on to point 
out, however, same of the distortions which are apparently being 
caused by certain aids. For instance in one Member State aircraft 
registered in that state pay lower airport charges than aircraft 
registered elsewhere. In others annual subsidies to cover losses 
on scheduled services are provided. Many aids do have valuable 
public policy purpose. Others do not. There is a clear need for 
Commission action in this field in laying down guidelines for the 
provision of state aids in the air transport sector. 
1Motion for a resolution contained in the Schwarzenberg 
report, Doc. 1-724/79 in point 14 of the resolution. 
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State aids and subsidies to protect services for social reasons for instance 
to remoter regions and communities have a strong justification, not least 
to praoote the inportant Ccmnunity objective of reducing econanic disparities 
between richer and poorer countries and regions. Nevertheless your 
rapporteur believes strongly that such aid should not be hidden but should 
be made as transparent as possible. 
39. Besides canpetition policy a further area for action has been mentioned on 
several occasions by those giving evidence to your rapporteur. If there 
could be sare limits to the growth of certain govei'l'llrent-controlled cost 
factors there could be a considerable i.npact on levels of air fares. The 
current high cost of landing and en-route charges is the rrost striking such 
area. It was sul:mitted to your rapporteur that they are roughly 5 times 
as high in Europe as in the United States, and represent rrore than 11% of the 
total European costs against only 4% in the U.S. 
40. A further striking figure is the much greater extent to which circuitous 
routes have to be adopted in Europe due to national defence and other factors 
carpared to in the United States. It has been calculated that 15% excess 
distances are flown in EUrope carpared to only 3% in the U.S. 
41. The need for much greater coordination of air traffic control within the 
Community is also clear. 
42. All these factors indicate the need for much broader cooperation at European 
level in the area of air transport, and also helps to illustrate the perhaps 
longer-tenn case for the establishnent of sate fonn of European civil aviation 
authority as suggested in paragraph 29 above. 
43. There is no question that there needs to be sate sort of overall franework 
for regulation of the air transport sector within the Community, avoiding 
cooplete deregulation at one end of the spectrum, which is politically and 
practically infeasible, and an over-dirigiste approach at the other. 
44. Short of deregulation, for instance, but nevertheless a step towards greater 
flexibility, would be the approach pioneered by the American Civil Aviation 
Board, before full deregulation was introduced, of establishing zones of 
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reasonableness for air fares. In the version introduced by the CAB in September 
1978, carpanies were permitted to set fares as much as 10 percent above and 
50 percent below a set fornula fare determined by the regulatory authority 
without prior CAB approval. Your rapporteur has indicated that this might 
be a useful approach in her Catrtelts on the Transport Camdttee' s opinion 
in paragraph 34 above. Of potentially even greater interest are the 
proposals put forward by the task force on Canpetition in intra-European air 
services (CCMPAS) established by the European Civil Aviation Conference 
(EX:J\C). In their recent report (CCMPAS report - May 1982) 1 they called 
for close examination of zones of freedan to carpete /safety nets not 
just for tariffs, but also for route entry and capacity as well_. For 
existing routes existing carriers would be permitted to nount additional capacity 
and additional carriers to introduce capacity, and for route creation, any existing 
or new carrier would be permitted to create an additional route, provided, in 
both cases, that certain basic criteria were ret. The report concluded 
(smrnary - paragraph 37 (c) and (d) ) "if these zones/safety nets were adopted, 
the regulation of airlines by goverrments would becate nore £lexible, and the 
airlines freedan to carpete \O,lld increase but, in both cases, the changes 
would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary," "It therefore believes that 
EX:J\C should develop a recatrteldation with regard to these three zone/safety 
net systems even if only on an experimental basis." Your rapporteur endorses 
these conclusions. 
45. Another issue which will need to be examined is the inter-relationship of 
charter and scheduled services. 
46. In another conte?ct steps could also be taken to encourage joint ventures 
between existing carriers, or even rrergers. It is ironic that the last real 
att~ts to establish a Catmunity-wide airline were over 20 years ago. 
47. One final ccmnent is an even wider one, previously referred to in paragraph 9 
above, namely that one .inportant contributory reason for the high level of air 
fares within the Community is the wider failure of the Community itself to build 
a prcprr internal market. The achievement of the custans union would have a 
major effect on sinplifying the design of airports. If there were effective contrc 
at the external borders of the Catmunity and less at the internal borders far 
less people would have to be channelled through one central point in the airport. 
1 
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The TAI study cited in the above (and described in rrore detail in Annex 
underlined this general point forcefully (on page 17 of the sunmary) when 
it states: "Why cannot a flight fran Brussels to London be made procedurally 
as sirrq;>le as a train journey fran Brussels to Paris?" 
could be great. 
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As the title of the study implies, the Civil Aviation Authority's 
study, issued in November 1977, had less sharply focussed conclusions 
than the AUC Study - and was more an initial examination of the 
problems raised from the point of view of a regulatory authority. 
The study included lengthy discussions of the problems involved in 
identifying costs, and of making meaningful international and inter-
firm com~arisons. Furthermore, on the definition of efficiency it 
concluded (p. 20) that "existing approaches to efficiency assessment 
afford no prospects of early results which can confidently be applied 
to regulatory policy". 
Nevertheless it did reach a number of tentative conclusions (p. 20). 
It pointed out, for instance, that "the evidence does suggest that 
US costs and fares are lower than those of European airlines, 
although the differences are much smaller than often suggested by 
crude comparisons". It f;ound on a number of specifically analysed 
routes that "the discrepancy between cost per first class passenger 
and fares was very substantial". It found it "hard to see the justi-
fication for this" and that the degree of cross-subsidisation between 
first class and other fare categories was unacceptable". It also con-
cluded that "on the short-haul routes examined, UK economy fares 
appeared to be reasonably related to British Airways cost levels, but 
on the longer routes studied, fares were substantially above cost, 
even with a full allowance for scheoule convenience and a reasonable 
return on costs". 
(The CAA report also included a summary of discussions held with a 
wide range of interested parties, including a number who were 
critical of the current level of European air fares, and also an 
examination of a number of studies carried out previously on relative 
airline efficiency, such as the Taussig Report, which found - inter 
alia - that British Airways' fleet was inefficient compared to US 
carriers, the so-calleC. "Anglo-American Study" which found that, 
having attempted to identify and quantify all the factors except 
inefficiency that might account for the diff~rence in unit costs 
between the UK and US airlines, there remained a residual cost dif-
ference of 16%, and the McKinsey Report which found that North 
American airlines achieved a significantly greater output per 
employee than their Eur0pean counterparts. The CAA, however, merely 
noted, and oid not endorse their conclusions). 
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~~~QE~ 
This study, prepared by a group of consultants, Transportation 
Analysis International, for the European Commission, and issued in 
October 1980, did not analyse European air fares, but was intended 
to provide a methodology for the Commission in their future work on 
air transport costs, and the relationship of these costs to fare 
levels. It pointed out the need for more complete information in 
the future and for both a cost model and a market/fares/yield model 
to be developed at Community level. It recommended that an attempt 
should be made to determine the economic cost of various categories 
of traffic(such as first class, economy, APEX, no-frill, full 
charter, etc) in order to understand the compensatory aspects of 
each fare category before cross-subsidisation. One real problem 
that was identified, however, was how to develop a uniform methodology 
for the assignment of costs to specifically European rather than 
world-wide operations. 
The study also recommended that the Community try to influence 
strongly those aviation cost-related factors most likely to inhibit 
the growth of the system,lan~,and en-route charges, fuel prices, 
re-equipment requirements and carrier return on investment, station 
and ground costs, and competition. One conclusion of the study was 
the extent to which the costs of European air carriers were dominated 
by items over which the carrier had little control, such as landing 
and en-route charges and fuel costs. Furthermore, it pointed out the 
extent to which national airlines were also subject to a number of 
non-commercial pressures, such as to serve unprofitable routes for 
social reasons, to create employment in the host country and to buy 
aircraft of local manufacture, which helped to undercut their 
efficiency. 
The European Civil Aviation Conference report, published in 1981, con-
centrated on three sets of issues, whether scheduled European air 
fares were too high (by reference to scheduled fares outside Europe 
or to charter fares), whether they were inconsistent (e.g. by dis-
tance) and whether they discriminated unfairly between different 
categories of passenger. 
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The report concluded that there was little evidence that European 
services as a whole had earned excess profits, although intra-European 
routes had generally achieved a level of profitability higher than the 
world average. Scheduled air transport services in the US tended to be 
relatively more efficient than those in Europe, but the difference was 
less than would be inferred from a simple comparison of the general 
level of fares in the two areas. Cost differences between scheduled 
and charter services were more attributable to differences in moce than 
to efficiency, and that while some efficiency gap did appear to exist it 
had to be interpreted cautiously, and appeared to be a contributory 
rather than major cause of high European fares. 
On consistency of pricing the report found that European normal 
economy fares were reasonably closely related to cistance, but with a 
taper in fares as distance increased, which was less, however, than the 
taper in costs. 
The task force found it impossible to reach unanimous conclusions 
on the issue of whether the European fare structure was discriminatory. 
For instance a major difference of view was apparent on the implications 
of prorating. 
It did, however, draw one or two important conclusions. It believed, 
for instance, that route costs could be identified with a reasonable 
degree of accuracy. "Consequently, the identification of price dis-
crimination and th~ whole approach of relating fares to costs caQnot be 
dismissed on the grounds of the arbitrariness of the allocation of costs 
to routes" (p.4). 
Furthermore, in looking at the costs of serving the on-demand market 
in isolation, the task force found that there was generally no problem on 
the shorter routes but that on the longer routes there was a general if 
not universal tendency for normal economy fares to exceed the costs of 
separate production - and on some of these routes the fare was found to 
be substantially above costs. 
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Draftsman: Mr KEY 
On 16 November 1981 the European Parliament referred the proposal from 
the Commission of the European Communities to the Council f·or a Directive 
on tariffs for scheduled air transport between Member States (Doc. 1-740/81) 
to the Committee on Transport for its opinion. 
On 27 November 1981, the Committee on Transport appointed Mr KEY 
draftsman. 
The committee considered the draft opinion at its meetings of 
29 March 1982 and 29 April 1982 and adopted the opinion at its meeting 
of 27 May 1982 by 12 votes to 6 with 2 abstentions. 
•rfln futluw.ing tonk pllrt in the vote: Mr Seefeld (t.•hai.rman), 
Dame She!agh Robe-rts (vice-chairman), Mr Carroaino (vice-chairman), 
Mr Kaloy~nnit: (vice-chairman), Mr Key (draftsman), Mr Albers, Mr Saudis, 
Mr Ad<1muu (dE'put.i:dng for Mr Cardi4), Mr Cottrell, Mr GalJcrt, 
l.urd llclrm•lr-N.irhnlls, Mr lloffmann, Mr Junot, Mr Klinkenbor9, Mr L•'lgakos, 
Mr Moreland (deputizing for Mr Marshall), ~r Martin, Mr Moorhouse, Mr Loo 
(deputi~ing for Mr Ripa di Meana) and Mr Skovmand. 
The opinion representing the minority view of Dame Shelagh Roberts 
(vice-chairman), Mr Howell (deputizing for Mr Cottrell), Mr Turn.er 
(deputizing for Lord Harmar-Nicholls), Mr Junot, Mr Moreland 
(deputizing for Mr Marshall), Mr Janssen van Raay (deputizing for Mr Modiano) 
and Mr Moorhouse is attached. 
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A. Main results of the air fares examination 
The proposed Tariff Directive is put forward on the basis of the 
conclusions in the Commission's Air Fares Study. Several important 
caveats need to be made. 
l (1) The Study· used 1979 data, a year of good airline traffic and 
economic performance. These •ssessments cannot j~mply be carried 
forward given the seriously'deteriorated airline results through 
1980/81 and expected in 1982. 
( 2) 'rh(• Commj ssion' s services have indicated that the conclusions .in 
(c) and (h) that there may be "unreasonable profits" and "unfair 
prices" are not relevant for 90-95 \ of European routes. 
(3) To view pricing on a point-to-point, strictly cost basis is not 
helpful to the development of an integrated Community air trans-
port tariff structure. Pricing should take into account network 
costs of principal carriers on the route and also market factors 
such as potential demand, traffic mix, etc. 
(4.) It is not practicable to effect major changes with respect to th~ 
establishment of scheduled air fares without dealing at the same 
time with charter traffic which amounts to some 50 ' of intra-
Community air services. 
One of the main justifications for the Commission's proposal is "that 
the present tariff-setting procedures are time consuming and too rigid" 
(paras 3 (a). and (b). However, it is not the present systems which are 
time consuming but the way in which they are utilised by governments to 
require each and every tariff and product change to be approved, often 
at great length. The proposal would not alter that situation but would 
instead make it necessary for governments to acquire extensive and 
costly specialised knowledge to deal on a day-to-day basis with an 
increasing number of conflicting tariff proposals. This 1n turn would 
lead to intergovernmental disagreements followed oy Commission arbitra-
tion, subject to possible review by the European Court of Justice. The 
new procedures will increase costs and delays, politicise disagr~em~nts 
and lead to bur~au~t~tic expansion - hardly a recipe !or an im~roved 
and rapid process. 
3 c-g are the other main ~onclusions of the examination concerning 
profitability of European operations, cost allocation and pricing 
methodology. These factors need to be viewed against the background 
of public service obligations that many European airlines must apply, 
the inherently high cost of European operations and the protection of 
labour obligations inherent in the European social system. Such 
obligations would not be best served by the disruption likely to occur 
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through the major changes proposed to the present tariff systems. 
Neither the consumer nor workers will benefit from such revolutionary 
measures which will force prices to levels where reasonable offsetting 
of losses on certain routes by benefits on others would not be possible 
and marginal routes would have to be abandoned and services concentrated 
on the high density major routes, a situation very much in evidence in 
the USA, where many small communities have lost services. 
B. The proposed Draft Directive 
ThP most distinctive feature of the Commission's proposal is that it 
mov••R i.IWay from mulLilaterallsm t.owardM unilateral ism and (rClPI 
runci I iat ju11 u,wards govt•rrunrntal ron!rontat3on. 
The Commission's proposal is moving towards unilatf:ral government and 
airline tariff setting. This is not geared to the development of an 
intergrated community tariff structure and would appear to contradict 
the very foundation of the European Communities, namely to promote 
closer relations between Member States. The proposal will distance 
EEC Member States from their governmental partners in the worldwide 
aviation community. 
(i) The proposed Directive suggests introduction of tariffs on the 
basis of approval of the country of origin. Less than 2 \ of 
all bilateral agreements in the world apply country-of-origin 
type principlei.These pri~ciples are in direct conflict with 
'1,. •I I 
thP ECAC 1967 multilateral agreement on ..tariffs, which relit•s , 
on bilateral procedures as a minimum and to which most EEC 
Member States and many non-EEC States are party. Implementation 
of the proposed system would probably mean denunciation and 
renegotiation of this agreement. It would also pr~sumably lead 
to renegotiation of numerous bilateral agreements with non-EEC 
States. 
(ii) The proposal misconstrues the actual functioning of the airline 
coordination system (particularly in its new more flexible form) 
and would effectively preclude tariff coordination on point-to-
point fares and would jeopardise the interline system. Although 
the Comnlission expresses its wish to continue to allow ir\tcr-
lininq, it fails to see that t.hr> interlininq sysl(•m will ho· 
lhrcat~ncd if Cdrriers dre unable to discuss their point-to-
point fares, which are competitively interrelated to each other 
and to interline tariffs. 
The Commission fails to recognise that the coordination of 
tariffs allows the development of an interrelated fares 
structure between Community States with other European 
States and with the worldwide system. 
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To conclude, the Commission is wrong in assuming that its proposal would 
not be disruptive and presents an evolutionary concept. Community air 
services are an integral part of the total European and world air network. 
We cannot effect the changes required under the Directive without serious 
repercussions upon that total system and on the commercial and legal 
obligations enshrined in numerous internation~l trading agreements. For 
the consumer, the airlines and the governments, the maintenance of the 
present multilateral and bilateral systems of tariff coordination and 
interlineability are too valuable to put at risk. However, improvements 
in the present system could and should be achieved by building on that 
system along the following lines: 
C. Alternative 
Over the past few year1 the develop~ent of the fares structure on the 
North Atlantic has given an example of the adverse economic consequences 
of a too swift movement toward deregulation. The most extreme results of 
such a policy can be appreciated when looking at the u.s. domestic 
deregulation experience. It is significant that in recent negotiations 
bctw<.•on ECAC govcrnments and the U.S., a compromise syst E:'m of mod.i f it~rl 
regulatory control is evolving and that in the international airline 
fora IATA has introduced a more flexible system for tariff setting. All 
these developments may well provide both a warning and a guideline for 
the intra-European air transport system. 
In essence lhe n~w system for North Atlantic fares is baaed on the 
establishment of a series of "Zones of reasonableness" for each of the 
main categories of product (e.g. First, Economy, piscount). Within 
these zones, airlines are free to compete at varying levelaJ any fare 
outside the zones remains subject to bilateral approval. A separate 
index\ of cost changes would also be established as a measure against 
which fare adjustments may be reviewed and implemented. Such flexibility 
would provide the desired improvement in tariff changes yet be 
accomplished within the present multilateral and bilateral network, 
thus pr<~s<>rving the need for common airline agreement on st.andards, 
inlcrlincability and handling. 
Governments within ECAC are already exploring the possibility, 
of introducing further flexibility in the present competitive 
environment of their airlines and EEC efforts should be 
coordinated with those ECAC activities. The airlines, for 
their part, should be encouraged through IATA to study the 
feasibility of introducing such added flexibility in the 
system. 
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It would, however, be essen·ual. before introducing any such 
radical modification in the existinq intra-European tarrif-
setting mechanism to await first the conclusion of a 
satisfactory agreement on the North Atlantic route and second 
its being experimented for at least a year or two in that 
area. 
The Committee en Transport draws attention to the report by 
Mr Carossino on the common transport policy (Doc. l-996/81) 
unanimously adopted.by Parliament on 9 March 1982, which rightly 
::tl1t.cs that. i.n rftrliftm~nt 'a opinion future meaRures in the f iC!ld of 
air tr.-ansport must be guided by'tho following princ~plesz 
- improvement of the services .offere,d to the transport user; 
- reasonable conditions of operation for viable airlines under 
efficient management; 
- safeguarding and expansion of employment; 
- improvement of air traffic safety; 
- reduction of environmental pollution by air traffic; 
energy saving. 
In the opinion of the Committee on Transport based on the above 
c•otuljctl:!r<~t inns, thn directive submitted by tho Cnmmis11-Jon r.'ll" tu 
c•umpl v wHh th i H rcr~ommeruJal ion. 
Taking account of the counterproposal made in this document, Parliament 
is urged to approve a recommendation that the European Commission closely 
monitor developments on the North Atlantic route and in EGAC and if 
appropriate in due course envisage the introduction of proposals for 
changes along the lines discussed above. 
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MINORITY OPINION 
A minority of members of the Transport Committee 
. believe that the present air fare fixing system needs 
:to be improved. Consequently, they support the Commission's 
proposed directive in the belief that it will introduce 
more scope for airline innovation and consumer choice 
without leading to dlsruptive effects or endangering the 
viability of Community airlines or entailing unacceptable 
labour disturbances. 
The minority believes that the Commission proposal 
follows a gradual evolutionary approach which would 
induce airlines and governments to consider new ideas. 
- - __ ... - - f\ 
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